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separate obligation." 2 Such an interpretation is placing an obvious
strain upon the exception to the parol evidence rule permitting the
admission of evidence to prove the existence of a collateral agreement.
The holding of the Court that this advertisement was an offer is
open to serious question. Defendant testified he would have offered
a much lower trade-in value for plaintiff's car had he known a 1954-55
deal was contemplated. Such accompanying circumstances as this
uncertainty as to price and the unusual nature of the announcement,
indicate the advertisement was merely an invitation to enter into
negotiation for an agreement.
The tenor of the majority opinion indicates an effort to discourage
extravagant and misleading advertising. The Court says: "'There
is entirely too much disregard of law and truth in the business, social,
and political world of to-day..... It is time to hold men to their
primary engagements to tell2the truth and observe the law of common
honesty and fair dealing.' " 6

CONTRACTS-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-COMP, LAiN-K ALLEGING BtEAcH oF CONTRAcr To CuRE Hna) SuF7IcIENT.--Plaintiff-

patient sought damages for breach of contract to cure. The complaint
alleged defendant-physician agreed to perform a minor operation on
plaintiff and to cure lIiim in one or tWo days, but that defendant
breached this agreement by puncturing :an abdominal organ which
necessitated further medical treatment and a consequent period of
convalescence. The trial court dismissed the action as being barred
by the malpractice statute of limitation. On appeal the Court of
Appeals held that a cause of action in contract was sufficiently stated.
Robins v.Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E2d 330 (1955).
Although the legal liability of physicians to their patients has
generally been restricted to the area of torts,' the ntumber and voriety
of claims against physicians involving a breach'of' 46oitract are by no
means insignificait. 2 The majority of jurisdictions-in' this country
hold that a physician and his patient are free to contract for a particular result and if that result be not attained, the patient may bring
25

26

Id.at 81.

Id.at 82, where the court quotes Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co.,

106 Ohio
St 328, 140 N.E. 118, 121 (1922).
1

See, e.g., Pike v. H-onsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898) ; Patten
v. Wiggin, 51 Me.. 594 (1862); Craig v.Chambers, 17 Ohio St.253 (1867);

Graham v. Gautier, 21 Tex. 111 (1858).

2 See Miller, The Contractual.Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953
WAsH. U.L.Q. 413, 416. See, e.g.-, Gill v. Schneider, 48 Colo. 382, 110 Pac. 62

(1910); Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159 (1874); Kolb v. Bergelin, 209 Wis. 547,
245 N.W. 583 (1932).
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a cause of action for breach of contract.3 This has been stated to be
true even where the physician
has employed the highest degree of care
4
in treating his patient.
The New York courts have recognized the contractual liability
of a physician to be separate and distinct from that which arises from
malpractice, 5 and have held that a dismissal of a cause of action for
malpractice as being barred by the statute of limitations is not a bar
to a subsequent breach of contract action based upon the same transaction. 6 This distinction, however, is not as clear-cut as would appear
and this is evident in cases where the breach of contract involves a
negligent act on the part of the physician. In the past, some courts
have dismissed complaints alleging a contract due to the use of language peculiar to a tort action. 7 The presence of allegations of unskilled performance and pain and suffering have identified the action
as malpractice, 8 subject to the two-year statute of limitations. 9
Since the statute of limitations in malpractice actions runs from
the date of the negligent act rather than the discovery of the injury, 10
it proves difficult in many cases for the plaintiff to bring his action
' See, e.g., Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st

Dep't), aff'd iern., 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930) ; Vanhoover v. Berghoff,
90 Mo. 487, 3 S.W. 72 (1887); Brooks v. Herd, 144 Wash. 173, 257 Pac. 238
(1927).
4"If a doctor makes a contract to effect a cure and fails to do so, he is
liable for breach of contract even though he use the highest possible professional skill." Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 768, 24 N.Y.S.2d
92, 95 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd nen., 286 N.Y. 649, 36 N.E.2d 692 (1941).
5 "The two causes of action are dissimilar as to theory, proof and damages
recoverable. Malpractice is predicated upon the failure to exercise requisite
medical skill and is tortious in nature. The action on contract is based upon
a failure to perform a special agreement. Negligence, the basis of one, is
foreign to the other." Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795
(3d Dep't 1949) ; see also Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 4.
6 Colvin v. Smith, supra note 5; Conklin v. Draper, srnpra note 3; Monahan
v. Devinny, 223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1928).
7 See, e.g., Frankel'v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d
Dep't 1918), aff'd mern., 228 N.Y. 582, 127 N.E. 913 (1920); Hurlburt v.
Gillett, 96 Misc. 585, 161 N.Y. Supp. 994 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 176 App.
Div. 893, 162 N.Y. Supp. 1124 (2d Dep't 1916).
8 See Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 App. Div. 158, 217 N.Y. Supp. 881 (1st
Dep't 1926). This case presents an excellent example of an instance where
the presence of allegations of tort damages (plaintiff sought damages for
physical pain and mental anguish) in the complaint has convinced the court
that despite allegations sufficiently stating a cause of action in contract, the
complaint was one for malpractice and negligence.
9 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 50. "Actions to be commenced within two years.

The following actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of

action has accrued: 1. An action to recover damages for . . . malpractice."
Ibid.
10 See Derlicka v. Leo, 259 App. Div. 607, 19 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1st Dep't),
aff'd mere., 284 N.Y. 711, 31 N.E.2d 47 (1940); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App.
Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't), aff'd nem., 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E.
892 (1930).
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within the statutory period.:" This has led to various attempts to
circumvent this time barrier by alleging the malpractice to be a continuing act, ending only at the termination of the physician-patient
relationship, 1 2 or that the physician perpetrated a fraud upon the patient by concealing his negligent act.' 3 These various attempts have
met with only limited success.
In the instant case, the plaintiff brought his action after the statute of limitations on malpractice had run, seeking compensation for
his damages in a contract action. 14 The complaint contained allegations of unskilled performance, physical disfigurement and loss of
earning capacity, all of which are characteristic of a tort action. It
did not, however, contain any request for tort damages such as pain
and suffering. The Court, seizing upon this, held that the tort allegations were insufficient to overcome the gist of the complaint which
stated a cause of action for breach of special contract to cure. This
characterization of the complaint would seem to indicate the Court's
awareness of the questionable justice of the time limitation on malpractice actions and its willingness to avoid the harsh result of the
application of such a bar to plaintiff's action. 15
The special contract action, however, is at best an inadequate
remedy. The courts have thus far limited recovery in such actions
to "out of the pocket" damages which include advances made to the
physician and immediate costs for nurses and medicines. 16 This does
not compensate the plaintiff for any pain and suffering resulting from
defendant's failure to perform as agreed. It would appear, therefore,
that even in cases where the plaintiff succeeds in circumventing the
two-year statute of limitations, the result is still unjust. The fault
does not lie so much with our courts as with the legislature. The
obstacle is Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act, and the only feasible
solution would be a revision of this section insofar as it affects malpractice actions. The concealed nature of malpractice7 warrants its
being treated much in the manner of actions for fraud'
L. REv. 330 (1938).
See Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct.

II See Note, 12 ST. JoHN's
12

1923).

13 See Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't
1926). The complaint alleged the defendant concealed the fact that a tooth
which he pulled had fallen down plaintiff's throat but not that he knew it had
lodged in plaintiff's lung. The court held the gravamen of the complaint to be
malpractice, that there were no allegations present from which any intentional
fraudulent misrepresentation could be inferred.
14 The plaintiff thereby received the benefit of the six-year statute of limitations which governs contract actions. N.Y. Civ. pRAc. Acr § 48.
Is The fact that the Court stressed the absence of allegations of pain and
suffering would seem to indicate that it would be unvilling, at this time, to
break with Horowitz v. Bogart and related cases. See note 8 supra.
16 See, e.g., Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't
1949); Hirsch v. Safian, 257 App. Div. 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1939).
17 For an excellent analysis of this problem, see 1942 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E)
RAP., N.Y. LAw Rmwsio
CotmissroN 13, 39 (1942).
See also Note,
16 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 101 (1941).

